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STOPPING PAYMENT ON A CASHIER'S CHECK
FRANCIS H. Fox*
Since the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter Code) has no spe-
cial provisions pertaining to cashier's checks, a bank's right to decline to
pay its own cashier's check is decided by reference to the statutory sections
which govern negotiable instruments in general. Although various courts
have recognized that the cashier's cheCk serves an important, if not unique,
commercial purpose,' no consistent judicial analysis of a cashier's check as a
legal obligation has emerged. Because of the important role which a
cashier's check plays on the commercial stage, this article will examine the
different ways in which courts have analyzed the rights and obligations aris-
ing from the issuance of a cashier's check.
The focus of this article will be on the right to stop payment of a
cashier's check. The nature of a cashier's check as well as the procedures
for stopping payment on ordinary checks will initially be considered.
Against this general background, both a bank's right to stop payment when
it asserts its own defense and the right to stop payment when a bank asserts
the defense of its customer will be discussed.
I. NATURE OF A CASHIER'S CHECK
A simple definition suffices to denote the legal character of a cashier's
check:
A cashier's check is simply a bill of exchange or draft drawn by a
bank upon itself and is accepted by the act of issuance. 2
Thus the drawer and the drawee are the same. The bank apparently has all
the obligations ol' both drawer and drawee except insofar as the obligations
of the one are owed to the other.
In considering the precise nature of a cashier's check, courts have
noted that cashier's checks are the functional equivalents of .cash. As stated
by the New York Court of Appeals: "by reason of the peculiar character of
cashier's checks and their general use in the commercial world they [are] to
*B. A. College of the Holy Gross, 1955; LL B. Harvard Law School, 1963; Partner,
Bingham, Dana & Gould, Boston, Mass.
' Bank checks, i.e. checks drawn by one bank upon another, may or may not share in
the specialized legal analysis that has been applied to cashier's checks. Compare Fulton Nat'l
Bank v. Delco Corp., 128 Ga. App. 16, 18, 195 S.E.2d 455, 457 (1973) (bank check is merely a
check where the customer is another bank) with Malphnts v. Home Say. Bank, 44 Misc. 2d
705, 707, 254 N.Y.S.2d 980, 982 (Albany County Ct., 1965) (hank or teller's check is taken as
the equivalent of cash). Certified checks share most of the same characteristics as cashier's
checks, but there are some differences. See J. BRADY. BANK CHECKS, § 7.6 at 156 (Bailey ed.
1969) (BRADY). This article addresses only cashier's checks and not any of the numerous other
kinds of instruments which fall on various points in the spectrum between being primary obli-
gations of the bank and purely private obligations of individuals. See generally Anno. Right of
Bank Certifying Check or Note by Mistake to Cancel, or Avoid WTI of, Certification, 25 A.L.R.3d
1967 (1969); Benson, Stop Payment of Cashier's Checks and Bank Drafts Under The Utiffi)rm Com-
mercial Code, 2 Onto N.L. REV. 445 (1975); Note, Personal Money Orders and Teller's Checks:
Mavericks Under the 67 COLUM L. REV. 524 (1967); Note, Blocking Payment On A Certified,
Cashier's or Bank Check, 73 Mica. L. Rt:v. 424 (1974).
2 BRADY, supra note 1, § 1.6 at 10. See, e.g., Walker v. Sellers, 201 Ala. 189, 191, 77 So.
715, 717 (1918); Pennsylvania v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 427 F.2d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 1970); 6 A.
MICHIE, BANKS Aso BANKING 359 (1975)
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be regarded substantially as the money which they [represent]." 3 Similarly,
a New Jersey Court has explicated the rationale for treating cashier's
checks as cash by observing that "people accept a cashier's check as a substi-
tute for cash because the bank stands behind it, rather than an individual." 4
Whether or not one characterizes the cashier's check as being "like cash," it
cannot be doubted that cashier's checks are widely used, are readily taken
by sellers, and thus serve a strong public policy. 5 A cashier's check, unlike
an ordinary check, stands on its own foundation as an independent, un-
conditional and primary obligation of the bank."
Some courts, while not disputing the concept that cashier's checks
serve an important function, have disagreed with the classical characteriza-
tion that a cashier's check is a draft drawn by a bank upon itself and ac-
cepted at issuance.' The courts which have taken issue with that definition
have relied on section 3-118 (a) of the Code which provides that a draft
drawn on the drawer is effective as a note. 8 Since the maker of' a note may
assert certain defenses against the holder and thus resist payment," such a
reference to the Code provisions pertaining to ordinary notes and checks
might lead a court more readily to allow payment stoppage of a cashier's
check upon the request of the bank's customer. Before looking closer at
this question, it is necessary to distinguish between payment stoppage of
ordinary checks and stoppage of cashier's checks.
I I. ORDINARY CHECKS: THE RIGHT TO STOP PAYMENT
An ordinary check is an instruction to the bank by the depositor-
customer to pay to the order of a named payee." Since the drawee bank is
not liable until it accepts the check," the check does not operate as an as-
signment of funds to the payee." In the case of an ordinary check the cus-
tomer has the right to countermand his payment order to the bank, prior
to the bank's payment or acceptance." Although processing stop payment
3 Hathaway v. County of Delaware, 185 N.Y. 368, 374 (1906). Numerous cases have dis-
cussed or commented upon the similarity of cashier's checks to cash. See, e.g., Munson v.
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 484 F.2d 620, 624 (7th Cir. 1973); Allison v.
First Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque, 85 N.M. 283, 286, 511 .P.2d 769. 772 (1973); First Nat'l
Bank v. Noble, 179 Ore, 26, 34, 168 P.2d 354, 366-67 (1946); Angelo v. Chemical Bank &
Trust Co., 529 S.W.2d 783, 786-87 (Tex. App. 1975).
4 National Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111  N.J. Super. 347, 351, 268 A.2d 327,
329 (1970). But see TPO, Inc. v. FDIC, 487 F.2d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 1973).
See Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 370 F. Stipp, 276, 278-79 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
g Pennsylvania v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank of Miami Springs, 427 F.2d 395, 400 (5th Cir.
1970).
TPO, Inc. v. FDIC, 487 F.2d 131, 135-36 (3d Cir. 1973); Banco Ganadero y Agricola,
S.A. v. Society Nat'l Bank of Cleveland, 418 F. Supp. 520, 524 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
5 TPO, Inc. v. FDIC, 487 F.2d 131, 135-36 (3rd Cir. 1973); Banco Ganadero y Agricola,
S.A. v. Society Nat'l Bank of Cleveland, 418 F. Supp. 520, 524 (N.D. Ohio 1976). See also
Laurel Bank and Trust Co. v, City Nat'l Bank of Conn., 33 Conn. Supp. 641, 365 A.2d 1222
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1976).
9 See U.C.C. §§ 3-306, 3-408.
1 ° Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 370 F. Supp. 276, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
U.C.C. § 3-104.
" U.C.C. § 3-409.
" U.C.C. §§ 3-409, 3-410.
" U.C.C. § 4-403. The countermanding order must be given in timely fashion. U.C.C. §
4-303.
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orders is burdensome, costly, and somewhat risky for the bank, according
to the Code draftsmen "stopping payment is a service which depositors ex-
pect and are entitled to receive from banks ...."' 4 To that end the Code
expressly provides that a customer may stop payment on "any item payable
for his account."'" Thus, stop payment orders on ordinary checks are
sanctioned by commercial practice as well as by the Code.
III. STOPPING PAYMENT ON CASHIER'S CHECKS
A. General Analysis
Unlike the liberality with which payment orders on ordinary checks
are countermanded, the general rule is that a cashier's check is not subject.
to countermand.'" Since "a cashier's check is a bill of exchange drawn by a
bank on itself, accepted in advance by the act of issuance, [it} is not gen-
erally subject to countermand." 2 Thus, under the general view, a cashier's
check has the free transferability normally associated with cash. Indeed, be-
cause the inability to "stop payment" has been deemed basic to the nature
of a cashier's check, some authorities have included this "characteristic" in
the very definition of a cashier's check.
This reluctance to allow the stopping of payment of cashier's checks
has been justified on the grounds that the rule serves the public policy fa-
voring the ready acceptance of cashier's checks in the marketplace. Refus-
ing to stop payment on cashier's checks is likewise consistent with the con-
ventional analysis that a cashier's check is a draft "accepted " at the mo-
ment of issuance.
If' the cashier's check is considered an accepted draft rather than a
note, it is nevertheless a primary obligation of the drawee bank.'" Under-
this classification, a cashier's check is not an item "payable for" the account
of the customer and thus the Code-defined right to stop payment of a per-
sonal check does not apply.'" Furthermore, any countermanding order
from the customer must be received by the .bank within a reasonable time
prior to acceptance. 2 ° Clearly, if the draft cashier's check — has been
deemed accepted at the moment of issuance, a subsequent request from the
"customer" to stop payment on the check is 'necessarily subsequent. to the
bank's acceptance of the check. 2 '
The analysis would not be markedly different if one were to consider
the cashier's check as a note, in accordance with U.C.C. § 3-118 (a), instead
of as a draft accepted at issue. If a cashier's check is a "note" of the
bank — a promise on the bank's part to pay — it is no more an item "pay-
able for" the customer's account than is a draft of the customer accepted at
U.C.C. § 4-403, Comment 2.
15 U.C.C. 4-403.
"'Munson v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 484 F.2d 620, 624 (7th
Cir. 1973); Pennsylvania v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank of Miami Springs Ha., 427 F.2d 395, 398 (5th
Cir. 1970); Ross v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 264 F.2d 262, 269 (4th Cir. 1959).
1?
	E, MOW note 2, at 359; see BRADv.supra note 1, § 13.7.
" See U,C.C. §§ 3 -409, 3-410.
" See U.C.C. § 4-403; Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank and Trust, 495 S.W.2d 572,
574 (Tex. 1973); Benson, supra note 1. at 448.
20 U.C.C. § 4-303.
21
 Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 370 F. Stipp. 276, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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the moment of issue by the bank." Indeed, regardless of whether the
cashier's check is a note or a draft, it is a direct obligation of the bank, and
the bank's customer, who holds the check, is not a party to the instrument
and is therefore not liable for the check. 23
 Since the cashier's check is the
exclusive obligation of the bank, the holder of the check does not have the
right to "stop" the payment which is owed by the bank—whether acceptor
or maker — to the payee. 24
Hence, whether or not payment can be "stopped" on a cashier's check
is not a function of the customer's untrammeled right to countermand his
own order. The analogy to the ordinary draft or note is inappropriate and
accordingly does not resolve the overriding issue of the circumstances
under which a bank may properly decline to honor its own primary obliga-
tion. The resolution of this issue should not depend on whether the pri-
mary obligation is viewed as a note or a draft.
This article will now examine the courts' treatment of the issue of
whether payment of cashier's checks may be stopped. The analysis will con-
sider the issue in the context of the two most familiar fact patterns: first,
the situation in which the bank has some defense of its own against the
payee or holder, and, second, the situation wherein the bank has been re-
quested by the person who originally procured the check not to pay it be-
cause of some claim or defense which that person has against the holder or
payee.
B. The Bank Asserts Its Own Defense
Although a cashier's check is most often issued by the bank at the re-
quest of its customer,25
 it quite often happens that the bank will, when it
comes time for payment, assert its own claim or defense on the instrument.
For example, the bank may have taken a check of its customer's and issued
a cashier's check in exchange, only to learn later that the customer's ac-
count had insufficient funds. In this case, the bank may wish to stop pay-
ment on its own cashier's check. If the cashier's check was obtained by a
worthless check or if the bank made a mistake in the issuance of the check,
the issue becomes whether the bank may decline to pay the cashier's check
and proceed to litigate the merits of its purported defense. If the oft re-
peated principle that cashier's checks are not subject to countermand is
stringently applied, the bank will be forced to pay the cashier's check re-
gardless of whether the bank has an otherwise recognizable defense."
22 See U.C.C. §§ 3-104, 4-403.
23 See Benson, supra note 1, at 448-49.
" See U.G.C. § 3-413 for a discussion of the contractual engagements of primary ob-
ligors on drafts or notes.
25
 The word "customer" is used herein in a broad sense as referring to the person who
has persuaded the bank to issue a cashier's check, regardless of whether or not that person
has an account, or any type of long-term business relationship, with the bank. "Remitter"
might be a more appropriate term, see W. liitrrroN, BILLS AND NOTES 177-81 (2d ed. 1961),
but the text of the U.C.C. does not use the .word.
26 It is beyond the scope of this article to explore the elements of every defense which
may be claimed. For example, precisely what circumstances will suffice to enable an accepting
or paying bank to escape payment or recover payment back by reason of mistake is a matter
of considerable uncertainty. Compare First Nat'l Bank of Portland v. Noble, 179 Ore. 26, 34,
168 P.2d 354, 366-67 (1946) and RESTATEMENT Or REsTrarrioN 33 (1937) with Wright v.
Trust Co. of Georgia, 108 Ga. App. 783, 788-89, 134 S.F. 2d 457, 462 (1963) and Rockland
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In the past, courts have almost always, by one means or another, al-
lowed the bank to litigate the merits of its defense to payment of the
cashier's check. If the bank is adjudged to have no valid defense on the
merits, then the court will order the bank to pay the check." Likewise, if
the holder has the rights of a holder in due course 28 or if the holder has in
good faith changed its position," then the bank will be ordered to pay
even though the bank might otherwise have had a defense. However, if the
bank has a valid defense and the holder is neither a holder in clue course,
nor one having the rights of a holder in due course, nor one who has in
good faith changed its position, the bank will prevail and will be allowed to
refuse to pay its own cashier's check. 3°
In general the defenses which have allowed banks to defeat holders of
the bank's cashier's checks cluster around fraud, lack or failure of consid-
eration, and mistake. For example, in Mine & Smelter Supply Co. v. Stock
Growers' Bank, 3 ' the bank issued a cashier's check with the expectation of
being paid the next day." When payment was not received the following
clay, the bank was permitted to "stop payment" on the cashier's check even
though the customer-payee introduced some evidence of change of position
at tria1. 3" In Kinder v. Fishers National Bank" the cashier's check was issued
in exchange for a check which, subsequently, was not paid because of a
stop order on the customer's personal check. 33
 The court found that pay-
ment of the cashier's check, which had not found its way into the hands of
a holder in due course, was properly refused by the bank."
These results appear contrary to the general principle that a cashier's
check is accepted at the time of its issuance and therefore payment on the
Trust Co. v. South Shore Nail Bank, 366 Mass. 74, 81, 314 N.E.2d 438, 443 (1974). The
question discussed herein is whether the courts will address the issue at all or rather will
merely enter judgment. against the bank because cashier's checks must be paid.
" Pennsylvania v. Curtiss Nail Bank of Miami Springs. 427 F.2d 395, 398 (5th Cir,
1970); Citizens Bank of Booneville v. National Bank of Commerce,' 334 F.2d 257. 260-61
(10th Cir. 1964); Banco Ganadero y Agricola, S.A. v. Society Nat'l Bank of Cleveland, 418 F.
Supp. 520, 524 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Gillespie v. Riley Mgmt. Corp., 59 III. 2d 211, 215, 319
N.E.2d 753, 756-57 (1974); First Nat'l Bank of Portland v. Noble, 179 Ore. 26, 34, 168 P.2d
354, 366.67 (1946).
" Citizens Bank of Booneville v. National Bank of Commerce. '334 12 .2d '257, 260-61
(10th Cir. 1964); Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank and Trust, 495 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex.
1973).
2" Citizens Bank of Booneville v. National Bank of Commerce, 334 F.2d 257, 261 (10th
Cir. 1964). See Mine & Smelter Supply Cu. v. Stock Growers' Bank, 200 F. 245, 247 (8th Cir.
1912); National Bank of California v. Miner, 167 Cal. 532, 534, 140 P. 27, 30 (1914).
TPO, Inc. v. FDIC, 487 F.2d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 1973); Mine & Smelter Supply Co. v.
Stock Growers' Bank, 200 F. 245, 247 (8th Cir. 1912); Banco Ganadero v. Agricola, S.A. v. So-
ciety Nat'l Bank of Cleveland, 418 F. Supp. 520, 524 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Bank of Coffee
Springs v. W.A. McGitvray & Co., 167 Ala. 408. 409, 52 So. 473, 474 (1910); National Bank of
California v. Miner, 167 Cal. 532, 534, 140 P. 27, 30 (1914); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Delaware
Auto Sales, 271 A.2d 41, 42 (Del. 1970); Tropicana Pools, Inc. v. First Nat'l Batik of Titusville,
206 So. 2d 48, 51 (Ct. App. Fla. 1968); Wright v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 108 Ga. App. 783,
788-89, 134 S.E.2d 457, 462 (1963); Kinder v. Fishers Nat'l Bank, 93 Ind. App. 213, 214, 177
N.E. 904, 906 (1931); Dakota Transfer & Storage Co. v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
86 N.W. 2d 639, 644 (N.D. 1957).
3 ' 200 F. '245 (8th Cir. 1912).
32 /d. at 247.
"Id. at 247-48.
34
 93 Ind. App. 213, 177 N.E. 904 (1931).
" Id. at 214-15, 177 N.E. at 905.06.
" Id. at '218-19, 177 N.E. at 906.
687
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
check cannot be stopped. Indeed, some courts while stating the general
rule have actually applied a narrower one. For example, in Wertz v.
Richardson Heights Bank and Trust," the court broadly enunciated the prin-
. ciple that a cashier's check is accepted at issue and that payment on the
check can not be countermanded. Despite its apparent adoption of this rule
of law, the court nevertheless considered the status of plaintiff and con-
cluded that plaintiff was a holder in due course. 38 If payment can not be
stopped on a cashier's check, the court's consideration of the plaintiff-
holder's status was unnecessary to the disposition of the case. Thus, Wertz
demonstrates that although courts broadly declare that payment on
cashier's checks may not be stopped, the specific holdings of such cases may
indicate adherence to a much narrower rule.
Contrary to the cases which have permitted the banks to stop payment
on their own cashier's checks, there are cases which have quite literally
applied the broad prohibitory language against stoppage of payment as to
cashier's checks when the bank attempted to assert its own defense. In
Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. 3"
 the court, noting that "it is be-
yond the power of the bank to stop payment" on cashier's checks after de-
livery, 4 ° ruled that evidence proffered by the bank that it had not received
consideration for the check was irrelevant. 41
 The court accordingly entered
summary judgment for the payee, who was not shown to have been a
holder in due course or to have changed her position in reliance upon the
check.'
The harshness created by strictly following the general principle has
been ameliorated in some cases by invocation of the doctrine of offset. In
Munson v. American National Bank & Trust Co., 43 plaintiff was the holder of
three cashier's checks issued by defendant bank. 44
 These cashier's checks
had been issued in exchange for a draft. which had been endorsed by the
payee to plaintiff and, in turn, endorsed by plaintiff. 45
 When payment was
stopped on the draft, thus depriving defendant-bank of its consideration
for the issuance of its cashier's checks, the bank attempted to stop payment
on its cashier's checks. 4° The court held that defendant could not "stop
payment" on its own cashier's checks. 47
 However, the court did permit the
37 495 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex. 1973).
38 Id.
" 370 F. Stipp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
4"
 Id. at 278.
4 ' Id. at 278-79.
"Id. In Kaufman, the court applied New York law, which has been notably strict in its
approach to the question whether a bank may avail itself of defenses of its customer when de-
clining to honor a cashier's check. In Moon Over The Mountain, Ltd. v. Marine Midland
Hank, 87 Misc. 2d 918, 924, 386 N.Y.S.2d 974, 978 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1976), however, the court
entered summary judgment against a bank which was attempting to raise a defense claimed by
its customer. The court specifically noted that the result would be different if the bank were
asserting a defense of its own, 87 Misc. 2d at 921, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 976. In Dziurak v. Chase
Manhattan Hank, N.A., 396 N.Y.S.2d 414, 416 (App. Div. 1977), the court held that, faced
with the adverse claim of its customer, the bank "could quite safely have stopped payment on
its cashier's check" and resorted to interpleader. Thus New York law may be less stringent
than the court in Kaufman assumed.
" 484 F. 2d 620 (7th Cir. 1973).
44
 Id. at 621.
"Id. at 621-22.
"Id. at 622.
"Id. at 624-25.
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defendant bank to offset its own claim against plaintiff on the dishonored
draft which plaintiff had endorsed against the payment owed to plaintiff by
virtue of the three cashier's checks.'" The court ruled that the bank's offset
created an affirmative defense to plaintiffs cause of action.'" A similar re-
sult obtained in Matter of Johnson" where the court held that the issuing
bank could not escape its obligation to pay its own cashier's check but could
offset. a debt: owed to the bank by the payee.'''
Neither the Munson nor the Johnson courts considered the question of
plaintiffs' status as holders in clue course as determinative of their rights to
recover on the cashier's checks. Rather, the two cases stand for a very
broad statement of the general rule that a bank may not stop payment, on
its own cashier's checks. Despite enunciation of this rule, in both cases the
bank was allowed to litigate the merits of its contentions and in each case
the bank prevailed to the extent of its offset.
Rather than adhering to the general rule, it would have been prefer-
able if the Munson court had recognized that the issuing bank can assert de-
fenses such as failure or want of consideration so long as the holder, suing
on the cashier's check, does not have rights equivalent to those of a holder
in due course. 52
 This is particularly true since the claim of the bank con-
cerned the very transaction from which the cashier's check issued. In gen-
eral, where the rights of innocent third persons are not. involved, there is
no overpowering reason to compel a bank to pay its own cashier's check
without regard to possible defenses. If the bank, under familiar principles
of law, has a valid defense against the plaintiff, it would seem that the
interests of ready acceptability of cashier's checks are not sufficient. to over-
come the bank's defense. However, where innocent third persons have
taken the instrument for value, perhaps relying upon the fact that, cashier's
checks are "like cash," then obviously the result must be different. These
principles should be recognized forthrightly in the analysis of the holder's
claim against the bank. Nothing is gained by resorting to concepts of offset
and permissive and compulsory counterclaims to achieve an equitable re-
sul0 3
The Johnson case, however, illustrates a situation where it is appropri-
ate to resort. to the principle of offset. No defense to the cashier's check is
asserted as such, but rather it happens that the payee itself owes the bank
money. Therefore, the analysis of the Johnson court would appear correct.
In situations where a holder sues the issuing bank on a cashier's check
and the bank asserts a defense of its own, the result of the litigation should
not depend upon whether the instrument is treated as a note or an ac-
cepted draft. Either a note or a draft qualifies as an instrument," and
"Id. Under U.C.C. §ti 3-414 and 4-207(2) plaintiff had undertaken to pay the draft
upon dishonor.
4" 484 F.2c1 at 625.
552 Kai 1072 (4th Cir. 1977).
51 Id. at 1077-78.
52 See cases and text at note 32 supra.
"Followed literally, the Muroan court's analysis would require the hank to pay if the
present plaintiff had endorsed the cashier's checks to a third person who had given no consid-
eration. The bank's claim against Mr. Munson could not, of course, be asserted as a
"counterclaim" against the third person who could thus force the bank to pay, despite its valid
defense and despite the fact that the holder gave no consideration.
" See U.C.C. § 3-104.
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holders, other than holders in due course, take instruments subject to
numerous possible defenses." Thus, the characterization of the cashier's
check as a note or a draft is somewhat pointless. Instead, in analyzing situ-
ations in which a bank wishes to stop payment on a cashier's check, courts
should permit the bank to litigate its defense so long as the rights of third
parties have not been jeopardized by the bank's refusal to pay its check.
C. The Bank Asserts The Defense of its Customer
Perhaps more typical than the case in which 'a bank asserts its own de-
fenSes to a cashier's check are those situations in which the bank is re-
quested by its customer to decline to pay the payee or endorsee on the
grounds that the customer has a claim or defense against the payee or
holder. The question is thus raised whether the bank may honor the cus-
tomer's request and then litigate the merits of the customer's contentions
when the payee or holder sues the bank for failure to honor its own
cashier's check.
The facts of a typical consumer transaction highlight the bank's di-
lemma. The bank's customer wishes to buy a car and the seller, reluctant to
accept a personal check which may be returned for insufficient fundi or
because of a stop payment order, readily takes a cashier's check, either
payable directly to the seller or payable to the buyer—the bank's
customer—and endorsed over to the seller. Following the purchase the
buyer discovers some problem with the car which causes him to ask the
bank to stop payment on the check while the buyer seeks to rescind the
sale. Thus, the bank's customer has requested the bank to refuse to honor
its own cashier's check.
As a starting point, it is clear that the customer has no absolute right
to require the bank to stop payment. This is so because the check consti-
tutes a primary obligation of the bank. It is not "payable for" the cus-
tomer's account, and furthermore, under the conventional analysis, the re-
quest for a stop payment comes after issuance and thus after "acceptance,"
whereas under the Code a stop payment order must be received a reason-
able time before acceptance." In reference to the lack of any duty on the
part of the bank to honor a stop payment request made after the bank has
certified acceptance of a check, the Code suggests that the drawee-bank "is
not required to impair his credit by refusing payment for the convenience
of the clrawer." 57 If the bank does not have to honor a stop payment re-
quest after it has accepted an ordinary check, the same principle a fortiori
applies with regard to cashier's checks since the hank's customer is not even
a party to such a check."
"See U.C.C. §§ 3-305, 3-306, 3-408. The act of acceptance, while creating a primary ob-
ligation on the part of the acceptor, U.C.C. § 3-410, does not forever preclude the acceptor
from any possible defense on the instrument. For example, the person obtaining acceptance
makes certain warranties to the acceptor, U.C.C. § 3-417, which presumably may be utilized by
the acceptor in appropriate circumstances. The finality of acceptance will often depend upon
whether or not the holder is a holder in due course. U.C.C. § 3-418.
5" U.C.C. §§ 4-303, 4-403.
57 U.C.C. 4-403, Comment 5.
58 Three pre-Code cases have held that, under the circumstances of those cases, the
hank was under a duty to stop payment on its cashier's check at the request of its customer.
Drinkall v. Movius State Hank, 11 N.D. 10, 13, 88 N.W. 724, 726 (1901); Nielsen v. Planters
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The options available to the bank faced with a request or demand by
its customer that payment of a cashier's check be stopped and a corre-
sponding demand by the holder that the bank's obligation be honored en-
tail an analysis of sections 3-603 and 3-306 of the Code. Section 3-603(1)
provides in part:
The liability [for payment] of any party is discharged to the ex-
tent of his payment or satisfaction to the holder even though it is
made with knowledge of a claim of another person to the in-
strument unless prior to such payment or satisfaction the person
making the claim either supplies indemnity deemed adequate by
the party seeking the discharge or enjoins payment or satisfac-
tion by order of a court of competent jurisdiction in an action in
which the adverSe claimant. and the holder are parties.
Under section 3-603(1), then, mere notice that the bank's customer thinks
that it was cheated by the seller does not impose a duty upon the bank to
decline to honor the cashier's check when presented by the seller. The
bank is not placed in the position of having to determine the merits of a
dispute between its customer and a third person. As Comment 2 to section
3-603 points out, "[W]hen the party to pay is notified of an adverse claim
to the instrument he has normally no means of knowing whether the asser-
tion is true." Thus section 3-603 relieves the bank of any responsibility for
arbitrating the dispute.
If, however, the customer either supplies indemnity deemed adequate
by the bank, or obtains injunctive relief in a case in which both the cus-
tomer and the holder are parties, then under section 3-603 the bank is
freed of its immediate obligation to, pay. 5 ° In either case, the claim of' the
customer against the seller must be litigated by the customer itself.
Moreover, under section 3-306(d) the bank may not, on its own, defend the
holder's suit by resorting to claims of the bank's customer. Yet if the cus-
tomer actually assumes the defense after indemnifying the bank fully," the
bank is entitled to the benefit of whatever claims the customer has and can
successfully assert against the holder.°'
The above resolution under section 3-603 and 3-306 demonstrates the
Code's handling of the complex common law concept of jus teriii or rights
of third parties. At common law an obligor could set up a claim of a third
person by way of defense to the action of the holder if the third person
Trust & Say. Rank, 183 La. 645, 647, 164 So. 613, 615-16 (1935); Wolf v. Title Guarantee &
Trust Co., 251 App. Div. - 354, 356, 296 N.Y.S. 800, 802-03 (1937), red, '277 N.Y. 626, 14
N.E.2d 193 (1938).
" U.C.C. 3-603(1). See U.C.C. 3-603, Comments 2 and 3. The bank may ultimately
be required to pay, of course, if' the holder prevails on the merits. Presumably the customer's
indemnity will have held the bank harmless and the customer will have litigated its claim in its
own name and at its own expense. U.C.C. § 3-306(d).
66 Requiring the customer to obtain injunctive relief or post indemnification is consis-
tent with the Code rule that a holder, other than a holder in due course, takes an instrument
subject to "all valid claims to it on the part of any person." U.C.C. § 3-306(a).
" It appears, according. to the terms of § 3-306(d) itself, that claims that the instrument
was stolen or that payment would be inconsistent with a restrictive endorsement may be raised
by the bank in defense to the holder's suit even if the third person asserting these allegations
does not make that defense for the bank. Other claims require the active participation by the
third person..
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had legal title to the instrument." However, the obligor-bank could not as-
sert a third party's rights if the third party had merely an equitable claim to
the instrument. 63
 The Code appears to expand the obligor-bank's alterna-
tives in the situation where the•cashier's check is presented by someone
other than a person having the rights of a holder in due course. If the
holder of the check is not a holder in due course and the bank's customer
requests that the bank not pay, the bank may ignore the request and de-
cline to assert defenses against the holder unless properly indemnified by
the customer, who must take over the burden of asserting the claim. The
bank will prevail if the customer succeeds in establishing any "valid claim"
to the instrument. Thus, the bank, under the Code, does not have to re-
solve the issue of title to the cashier's check and may choose
- not to become
embroiled in the dispute between its customer and the check's holder.
Given the broad Code definition of claims against instruments allow-
ing the batik to disengage itself from the controversy is a commercially
sound policy. Specifically, Comment 2 to section 3-306 states:
"All valid claims to [the contested instrument] on the part of any
person" includes not only claims of legal title, but all liens,
equities, or other claims of right against the instrument or its
proceeds. It includes claims to rescind a prior negotiation and to
recover the instrument or its proceeds. 64
Thus while the Code uses the word "claim" instead of "claim or defense," if
the customer's complaint against the seller-payee is serious enough to give
rise to the right of rescission of the underlying transaction, the customer
may assert this defense and if the defense is valid the customer may claim
the proceeds of the cashier's check by way of rescission or restitution. 65
However, it should be noted that the customers' claims must be related to
the issuance or transfer of the cashier's check and unrelated claims which
the customer. might have against the seller will not be considered."
Pre-Code cases sometimes allowed, or even occasionally required, a
bank to refuse to pay its own cashier's check if the customer asserted some
claim against the holder-seller. The decisions did not always purport to
consider whether the holder had "legal" title to the cashier's check. Thus,
courts did not consistently adhere to the common law principles referred to
in the literature." For instance, if the cashier's check was transferred to the
62 Note, Blocking Payment On A Certified, Cashier's or Bank Check, 73 Micii. L. REV. 424,
428-33 (1974). See also 5 C. Zoi.I.NIAN, BANKS AND BANKING § 3198 (1936); 2 T. PATON, DIGEST
OF LEGAL OPINIONS 1656 (1918); Chafee, Rights in Overdue Paper, 31 HARV. L. REV. 1104, 1108
(1918).
"3
 Note, supra note 62, at 428.33,
"4
 See also U.C.C. § 3-306, Comment 5:
6 ' See generally Comment, Adverse Claims and the Consumer: Is Stop Payment Protection
Available?, 67 Nw. U. L. REV. 915 (1973). See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-608, 2-711. See also Jacobs v.
Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 462, 465, 188 S.E.2d 250, 254 (1972) (car pur-
chaser able to recover the purchase for a breach by the seller of its warranty to repair).
68
 Under the fairly liberal permissive counterclaim procedures now available in many
jurisdictions, the customer as a practical matter might be able to force litigation of even such
unrelated matters before a final judgment enters. See, e.g., FEU. R. Ctv. P. 13(b). Whether this
could be accomplished in a particular case would depend upon such factors as the court's will-
ingness or ability to sever or to order separate trials, see id. 13(i) and 42(b), or enter partial
summary judgment, see id. 56(d) and 54(b). Such questions are beyond the scope of this article.
67 See authorities cited in note 49 supra.
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holder by the customer in payment of an illegal gambling debt, the bank
could properly refuse to pay the holder." One case even went so far as to
rule that where the cashier's check was endorsed over to pay an illegal
gambling debt, payment could be subsequently refused a holder in due
course since gambling debts are absolutely void." Similarly, if the customer
alleged fraud on the part of the seller and the customer persuaded the
bank to decline to pay, the bank was entitled to litigate the merits of the
fraud allegations.'" Failure or want of consideration was also a sufficient
excuse to allow a bank, at the request of its customer, to decline to pay."
In these situations, the bank could, rather than pay the holder, resort to in-
terpleader where there were competing claims to the check."
There have been comparatively few cases decided under the Code
considering the issue of whether the bank can raise the claims or defenses
of its customer when faced with the demand of the holder that a cashier's
check be paid. In one such case, National Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano,"
the court asserted that cashier's checks must be honored. There, a cus-
tomer, stied by the bank on a loan balance, defended on the ground that
the bank should have honored its request to stop payment on a cashier's
check issued to a truck seller who allegedly had sold the customer a defec-
tive truck." The New jersey Court ruled against the customer, asserting in
broad terms that cashier's checks cannot be countermanded. 75 Despite its
broad language, however, given the facts and allegations, the case merely
stands for the proposition that a bank may not be compelled to honor its
customer's request to stop payment. It remains to be seen whether the New
Jersey Court would hold, following the broad language in Giordano, that a
bank which did honor its customer's request, obtained appropriate indem-
nity and had the customer defend, was acting improperly without regard to
the merits of the customer's case.'"
Unlike the bank in Giordano, the bank in Moon Over The. Mountain, Ltd.
v. Marine Midland Bank, 77 honored its customer's request to stop payment.
In Moon Over The Mountain, Ltd., the customer filed an affidavit with the
bank asserting that the check had been lost and requested the bank not to
honor the check.?" Nonetheless, the court entered summary judgment for
"" Nielsen v. Planters Trust & Say. Bank, 183 La. 645, 647, 164 So. 613, 614 (1935);
Drinkall v. Movius State Bank, 11 N.D. 10, 11-13, 88 N.W. 724, 725-27 (1901). See Winecoff
Operating Co. v. Pioneer Bank, 179 Tenn. 306, 309, 165 S.W.2d 585, 588-89 (1942)
("cashier's negotiable certificate," holder prevails on the merits only because he was holder in
cl ue  course).
Manufacturers' & Mechanics Bank of Kansas City v. Twelfth St. Bank, 223 Mo. App.
191, 194, 16 S.W.2d 104, 106 (1929).
7" Leo Syntax Auto Sales, Inc. v. Peoples Bank & Say. Co., 215 N.E.2d 68, 70-71 (Ct,
Corn. Pleas Ohio 1965). See 6 A. MicittE, BANKS AND BANKING 372-73 (1975).
First Nat'l Bank of Mishawaka v. Associates Inv. Co., '221 N.E,2d 684, 688 (Ind. App
1966). This case concerned a variation of the cashier's check equivalent of the eternal triangle;
bank, car purchaser, and auto dealer. Id. at 684-85.
" State v. District Ct. of First Jud. Dist., 94 Mont. 551, 25 P.2d 396, 399 (1933).
" I 1 1 N.J. Super. 347, 268 A.2d 327 (1970).
74 Id. at 348, 268 A.2d at 328.
"Id. at 350, 268 A,2d at 329.
76
 The customer in Giordano did offer to post a bond in favor of the bank if it would
stop payment. Id, at 350, 268 A.2d at 329. The court in ruling that this fact was irrelevant did
not refer to § 3-603(1).1d.
77
 87 Misc, 2d 918, 386 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Civ, Ct. N.Y. 1976),
" Id. at 919, 386 N.Y.S.2c1 at 975.
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the holder against the bank, noting that under section 3-802 the payee's
rights on the underlying transaction were lost once a cashier's check was
taken in payment.'" Section 3-802 provides that if an instrument is taken
for an underlying obligation, the obligation is automatically discharged if a
bank is the drawer, maker, or acceptor of the instrument. Thus, with the
payee's, or holder's, rights in the underlying transaction gone, the court
found that it would be inappropriate to permit the bank, now the primary
and sole obligor, to escape its liability on the instrument. 8°
In analysing Moon Over The Mountain, Ltd., several points should be
recognized. First, the court specifically stated that a bank may stop payment
if it has a defense of its own, rather than an attempted defense of a third
pany. 81 Second, the court pointed out that the customer's affidavit, upon
which the bank relied, was cursory." Finally, the holding on the facts is
correct: the bank attempted to avoid its own obligation by raising a claim or
defense of a third person who was not a party to the case and who was not
defending on behalf of the bank. Thus, the third person's claims were ir-
relevant under section 3-306(d) and the bank should have paid the holder
of the check.
Another case addressing the general issue of a bank's right to refuse
to honor a cashier's check is Dziurak v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A." There,
the court delineated procedures which a customer must follow to authorize
a bank to stop payment. In Dziurak, the bank's customer had obtained a
cashier's check payable to himself and had endorsed it over to one Staveris,
who had sold the customer an interest in a restaurant. 84 Claiming Fraud in
the sale of the restaurant, the customer asked the bank to stop payment but
Staveris demanded and received payment from the bank. 85 In the cus-
tomer's suit against the bank, the New York lower court ruled that the
bank should have acceded to the customer's request and entered judge-
ment in favor of the customer." The Appellate Division reversed the lower
court's judgment but stated that "the .Bank, as a practical matter, could
quite safely have stopped payment" and resorted to interpleader. 87 The
79 /d. at 920-21, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 976-77. U.C.C. 3-802(1) states, in part:
(I) Unless otherwise agreed where an instrument is taken for an underly-
ing obligation
(a) the obligation is pro tanto discharged if a bank is drawer, maker or ac-
ceptor of the instrument and there is no recourse on the instrument against the
underlying obligor ....
Analytically, this section should not affect whatever right a bank may have to decline to
pay a cashier•s check at the request of its customer. Section 3-802 merely determines that the
seller takes the cashier's check as payment, as he would with cash. This obviously has no effect
on the buyer's right to rescind in a proper case. Rescission can be obtained even where cash
payment has been made. The assertion of a right to rescission by the buyer-customer would
give rise to a "claim" to the check, see U.C.C. § 3-306(a) and Comments 2 and 5. Such a claim
could be raised as a defense by the bank against the holder if the customer defends the action
for the bank. U.C.C. § 3-306(d).
"" Moon Over The Mountain, Ltd., 87 Misc. 2d at 923-24, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 977-78.
" Id. at 920 IL * , 386 N.Y.S.2d at 976 n.*.
"id. at 923-24, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 977-78.
" 58 App. Div. 2d 103, 396 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1977).
"Id. at 105, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
" Id.
" hi, at 108, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 417.
" 7 /d. at 107, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 416.
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court noted, however, that the bank was under no duty to do so since the
customer had not offered an indemnity bond nor sought an injunction."
The court ruled that since the customer did not pursue either of the two
remedies available under section 3-603(1), the bank was entitled to honor
the check."
Dziurak stands for the proposition that section 3-603 applies to
cashier's checks and that payment can be stopped if the customer either re-
sorts to the injunctive power of the court or posts indemnity for the bank.
If the customer does neither, the bank may, nonetheless, pay the money
into court and let the competing claimants litigate their claims. If' the cus-
tomer does not comply with section 3-603(1), however, the bank acts prop-
erly in paying the holder and is discharged from liability.
Assuming that section 3-603(1) does apply to cashier's checks and that
a bank may properly decline to pay its check if the customer posts indem-
nity and agrees to defend the bank itself, the question then becomes
whether the bank must refuse to pay the holder of the cashier's check in
those circumstances. While the question is not free from doubt, the lan-
guage of section 3-603, together with the Comments thereto," indicates
that if the customer adheres to the procedures set forth in section 3-603(1),
the bank must decline to pay the instrument. The rationale for this result is
that the bank presumably has adequately protected itself by virtue of the
indemnity posted by the customer." While there certainly are strong
policies to be served in favoring unimpeded processing and paying of these
unique instruments, those interests would not appear logically served by
leaving the question to the uncontrolled discretion of the paying party. If
the bank is fully protected, the Code seems to contemplate that the two
protagonists, the bank's customer and the ultimate holder of the check,
should be allowed to litigate their contentions. Since the indemnity pro-
vided by the customer is a serious and expensive step, the customer is un-
likely to proceed under section 3-603(1) unless the customer is convinced
that he has a substantial claim against the holder." Moreover, since the liti-
gation of legal rights between customer and seller, once payment has been
fully accomplished, will often be a hollow exercise," a customer who fol-
" 1' Id.
89 Id .
" See Comment 3, which slates, in part: 'The paying party may pay despite notification
of the adverse claim unless the adverse claimant supplies indemnity ...."(emphasis added).
91 Section 3-603(1) provides that the indemnity must "be deemed adequate" by the
bank. Comment 2 points out that there is no good reason to put the paying party to incon-
venience because of a dispute between two other parties. Presumably, as the Dziurak court
seems to have implied, indemnity would entail a bond and not merely a hold harmless agree-
ment. "[T]he plaintiff was aware that ... he could file an indemnity bond to protect the
bank ...." 58 App. Div. 2d at 107, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 416. Although if payment is not made the
'face amount of the check will be available when the litigation is concluded, there may well be
attorneys' fees, incidental expenses, and possibly even consequential damages to take into ac-
count. See Allison v. First Nat'l in Albuquerque, 85 N.M. 283, 286, 511 P.2d 769, 772 (1973).
Payment into court, where available, would be a desirable alternative. See the discussion on
this point in Note, supra note 62, at 433-43.
" 2 See note 69 supra.
" in Dziurak, the seller was paid by the bank, the customer obtained a judgment. against
the seller, but no part of it was collected. 58 App. Div. at 104, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 415. Obviously,
a dispute over whether a cashier's check is to he paid will often, as a practical matter, entail
more than a question of the mere timing of' payment.
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lows the Code procedure should be able to force a bank to refuse payment
on a cashier's check. The Code, by requiring indemnification of the bank
or judicial intervention by way of injunction, has assured that the bank
need not, at its peril, adjudge the merits of the bank customer's claim
against the holder. Since the Code provides protection for the bank, there
is no reason for allowing the bank to disregard its customer's stop payment
request.
In sum, Dziurak's application of section 3-603 to cashier's checks is
commercially sound. The alternatives available to both the bank and its cus-
tomer when a stop payment on a cashier's check is demanded are clearly
delineated thus fostering commercial predictability. Unlike the common law
result, Dziurak permits the merits of the stop payment contest to be litigated
by the interested parties — the bank customer and the holder. Thus,
Dziurak advances a desirable and practical result to the issue of payment
stoppages of cashier's checks.
CONCLUSION
Although much of the case law contains broad language indicating
that cashier's checks must be paid and are not subject to countermand; the
holdings of the cases indicate a much narrower rule of law. Where the
bank asserts defenses of its own to payment of the cashier's check, the
widespread tendency among the courts is to allow the bank to litigate
the merits of its defense as well as the status of the holder as a holder in
due course. If the bank prevails on both of these points, its refusal to pay
will be upheld. While this result theoretically may detract from the im-
mediate recognition which the business community affords to cashier's
checks, the proposition that a bank must pay even though it may have a
valid defense to payment and even though the rights of innocent third per-
sons are not involved is not one which commends itself as appropriately in-
voked merely to serve such a goal.
Where the bank has issued the check at the request of its customer
and subsequently is requested to stop payment by the customer, the case
law is unclear. Despite the uncertainty in the case law, however, it is appar-
ent that sections 3-306(d) and 3-603 apply to the situation. 94 Adherence to
these Code provisions would produce a just and practical solution favoring
immediate payment to the holder. The bank need not run an unsecured
risk of being second-guessed as to which of competing claimants has the
best entitlement to the proceeds. Moreover, under section 3-603 the person
asserting that the bank should depart from the ordinary and desirable
practice of paying its obligees must either persuade a court to order this be
done or else post adequate and substantial security before the bank must
refuse to pay the check. This latter is not a course lightly to be taken by the
customer, and accordingly frivolous or weak claims will not likely be pur-
sued.
" It is suggested by one commentator that the Code should be amended to add a spe-
cific provision allowing payment to be stopped only by resort to the injunctive power of the
courts. Note, supra note 62, at 441-43.
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No substantial difference is discernible in the Code as being depen-
dent upon the conceptual characterization of a cashier's check — draft or
note — or the bank's status thereon — acceptor or maker. The bank is the
party liable on the instrument. Where the bank asserts its own defense the
outcome will depend upon the merits of its contentions and the status of
the holder. Where the bank attempts to raise the claims of its customer, the
customer should proceed under sections 3-603 and 3-306(d) and either in-
demnify the bank or obtain an injunction. These sections provide protec-
tion to a "party liable" on an instrument who makes "payment" or seeks
"discharge." The protection is not aimed only at a particular category of
"party liable" such as acceptor, maker, or drawer.
Finally, it would be well For the courts to eschew the phraseology of
"stopping payment" when consideririg the question of' a bank's right to de-
cline to pay." 5
 The phrase, rooted in the concept that a customer has an
absolute right to order his bank not to pay, serves mainly to confuse the
issue. The obligation on the instrument is that of the bank, and the law,
not the "customer's" whim, should dictate when a bank may avoid this obli-
gation.
" The writer acknowledges that he has not himself completely avoided the phrase
herein.
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